INTRODUCTIONONE APRIL DAY in 2001， Lin Di sat before an exclusiveaudience in Washington， DC。 His host， the former USgovernment China expert Chas Freeman， gave only abrief introduction to the talk。 Lin was well known toFreeman and the many foreign policy luminariesgathered at the National Press Club。 As secretary-generalof a key Chinese cultural exchange organisation， Lin hadestablished contacts across America’s policymaking circlesand Chinese communities。 In Beijing， he’d warmlywelcomed dozens o INTRODUCTIONONE APRIL DAY in 2001， Lin Di sat before an exclusiveaudience in Washington， DC。 His host， the former USgovernment China expert Chas Freeman， gave only abrief introduction to the talk。 Lin was well known toFreeman and the many foreign policy luminariesgathered at the National Press Club。 As secretary-generalof a key Chinese cultural exchange organisation， Lin hadestablished contacts across America’s policymaking circlesand Chinese communities。 In Beijing， he’d warmlywelcomed dozens of American officials， China scholars，congressional staffers and retired diplomats。1A slightly built man with his face fixed in a disarmingsmile， Lin began his address in a shaky voice。 ‘I’m alittle bit embarrassed to speak in front of a camera， andin English，’ he admitted。 He had studied the UnitedStates extensively， including at the China campus ofJohns Hopkins University， but politely professed that hewas no America specialist。 Instead， he’d come to talkabout China。Lin’s optimism surprised the audience。 China， hedeclared， ‘is deepening her reform to build a more open，prosperous， democratic and modernised nation’。 Despitepolitical disagreements between China and the UnitedStates， he said that China wished to focus on theoverwhelming positives in the relationship。 ‘It is mysincere hope that in this new century our two greatcountries will work together to build a healthy andsteady relationship for the lofty cause of world peaceand progress of human civilisation，’ he said。People-to-people exchanges through his organisationwould provide a crucial foundation for this endeavour。Closing off his speech， he described an idyllic future inwhich his children would look back and have nomemory of a time when there was anything butfriendship between America and China。It was all a lie。 In reality， Lin was chief of the SocialInvestigation Bureau of China’s premier intelligenceagency， the Ministry of State Security （MSS）。 He was aspy。 At the time， his bureau was the primary USoperations unit within the MSS， and he personallyoversaw an extensive network of clandestine assetsacross the country。 In between these publicengagements he’d rendezvous with agents， like onewoman the Federal Bureau of Investigation mistakenlyviewed as their star source on China。Yet handling double agents and spies wasn’t the mostimpressive part of Lin’s job。 Far more impactful was theinfluence and leverage MSS spies carefully developedover elites around the world， and especially in the UnitedStates。 This involved schmoozing， making friends andopening doors， and much less of cloak and dagger。 It’sexactly what Lin did that day in Washington， DC。 Withtheir high-level connections inside the Chinese CommunistParty （CCP）， Lin and other undercover MSS officersclaimed to have insider knowledge of China’s directionand could offer meetings with Party leaders to a chosenfew。Over decades， the MSS has deployed these techniquesto mislead world leaders about the CCP’s ambitions，lulling them into the comfortable belief that China wouldrise peacefully – maybe even democratically – and slotitself into the existing international order。 Its targets haveincluded former presidents and prime ministers，multinational corporations， business leaders， Buddhistmonks， influential think tanks and respected Chinascholars。 It’s an influence operation that continues to thisvery day。This is the first book to reveal the MSS’s influenceoperations: this most potent part of the CCP’sintelligence work has been the most overlooked，misunderstood and ignored。 The few books on theParty’s intelligence apparatus glide over the issue ofinfluence operations。 Dedicated studies of China’sinfluence operations have only speculated about MSSinvolvement。2 Even within counterintelligence agenciesthat try to interrupt the plans of China’s spies， thesignificance of these activities has long been downplayed，and little has been done to impede them。 Thisknowledge gap exists in part because the covert natureof MSS work means that its influence operations areoften mistaken for those of more visible Party organs，such as the United Front Work Department （UFWD）。 Onthe contrary， this book suggests that most of the CCP’shigh-level influence operations are orchestrated byintelligence officers。Instead， it’s the more conventional parts of the MSSthat attract the most scrutiny and have contributed tothe perception of the MSS as an aggressive butunsophisticated intelligence agency。 A recent deluge ofcourt cases， leaks and media exposés has revealed theMSS’s appetite for trade secrets， sensitive technology，and intelligence on foreign politics and dissidentcommunities。 Often these operations were exposedbecause the MSS officers involved in them made basicmistakes， like using unsecured phone lines tocommunicate with agents。 Since the 2000s， greaternumbers of MSS officers have been expelled or quietlybarred from countries including the United States，Sweden and Germany。 Starting in late 2017，governments started to publicly accuse the MSS offar-reaching cyber espionage campaigns againstcompanies， individuals and government agencies。3The immensity of the CCP’s intelligence community isanother distraction from its influence operations。 Alongsidethe MSS， the People’s Liberation Army （PLA） has threemain intelligence agencies， roughly responsible foreavesdropping and hacking， human intelligence operationsand analysis， and political warfare。4 China’s Ministry ofPublic Security， nominally a police agency， also has along history of foreign intelligence operations， including anunsuccessful attempt to influence the Trumpadministration in 2017。5Even within the MSS there are subordinate units inevery region and major city of China that often take thelead on foreign operations。 Put together， these localcounterparts likely have well over 100，000 employees –perhaps ten times more than the MSS’s headquarters。Sitting around these core agencies， additionalParty-state organs， private and state-owned companiesand lone actors appear to feed into the Party’sintelligence system。 Chinese companies have been caughtencouraging employees to bring back proprietaryresearch from foreign rivals。 A Chinese official mightopportunistically glean sensitive information from a friendor relative in America。 From the outside， it looks like anincoherent mess of overlapping responsibilities andunprofessional intelligence operations。 And sometimes it is。If you’re looking for Chinese state intelligence activity，there’s plenty of it – enough to keep you busy withouthaving to step back and worry about influenceoperations。What this shows is that the CCP supervises anextensive array of professional intelligence agencies andcalls on hundreds of thousands of intelligence officers todo its bidding。 Though coordinating this web of agenciesand spies is a nearly impossible task， intelligenceoperations are a fundamental source of power andinfluence for the Party。 Their activities are deliberatelyhidden， making them easy to forget and overlook， buttheir significance is difficult to understate。 Peter Mattis， anexpert on China’s intelligence services， argues thatdelving into these organisations does much more thanhelp catch spies。 Properly analysed， MSS activities offerunrivalled insights into the Party’s inner workings andambitions。 Understanding the operation of the Party’sintelligence apparatus is essential to understandingChina’s past， present and future。6The prevailing view until recently was instead that theParty used a ‘thousand grains of sand’ approach togathering intelligence。 This theory has since beenthoroughly debunked， and its flaws help in understandingwhy the MSS and its influence operations have receivedso little scrutiny。7 The ‘grains of sand’ analogy explainsthat if Russia needed to gather a thousand grains ofsand from a beach （that is， a thousand pieces ofintelligence）， it would send a submarine to deploy ahighly trained team of clandestine agents to shovel upsand in the dead of night。 In contrast， China would senda stream of tourists to the beach in broad daylight，each picking up a single grain。 Back in Beijing， eachgrain of sand is then analysed and aggregated to forma brilliant picture。 The central claim of this theory is thatChina relies on ad-hoc masses of ethnic Chineseamateurs to steal huge amounts of low-gradeinformation， with relatively little involvement byprofessional spies and intelligence agencies。It’s a catchy narrative with amusing imagery， but that’sabout all it offers。 Instead of looking for the structure，mission and intelligence officers behind the CCP’sinfluence efforts， the ‘grains of sand’ theory makes iteasier to assume they’re largely autonomous and drivenby ethnic Chinese patriots。 Peter Mattis criticised thetheory for wrongly framing the threat in racial terms，when China’s intelligence agencies have comfortablyrecruited people without Chinese heritage。8 WhenWestern governments also treated harassment andsurveillance of ethnic Chinese communities as a minorconcern， this helped the MSS face little resistance as itbuilt up extensive foreign intelligence networks。9My research into the CCP began from a similar positionof ignorance about its intelligence apparatus。 My entréewas the UFWD， a Party agency that had long beenneglected by China scholars。10 The department plays aleading role in efforts to co-opt important groups andindividuals in China。 Internationally， it seeks to manipulateand claim the right to speak on behalf of ethnic Chinesecommunities， which includes managing Chinese studentorganisations。In 2016， I was a university student in Canberrastudying China and working on my Chinese-languageskills。 After living in China as a teenager， I was surprisedto discover CCP influence on campus。 The previous year，the president of a Chinese government–backed studentassociation threatened the university pharmacy until itstopped stocking copies of a dissident Chinesenewspaper。 Media reports claimed that similar groupswere used by the Chinese government as informantnetworks to collect intelligence on students， fearful thatthey might bring Western ideas or verboten religiousbeliefs back to China。11 After I published articles in theuniversity newspaper about these findings， members ofthe same student association responded by aggressivelyfollowing me around at an event， including into thebathroom， and accusing me of racism。12It was terrifying and exciting to me， and I later hadthe opportunity to focus on this issue when I helpedClive Hamilton research his 2018 book Silent Invasion:China’s influence in Australia。13 Examining recentcases of what looked like CCP efforts to covertlyinfluence Australian politics， media and society， we quicklyfound that the UFWD was connected to many of them。Billionaire property developers， self-appointed communityleaders and numerous political candidates who had ahistory of alignment with the CCP’s interests were almostinvariably members of organisations controlled by theUFWD。At the same time， a handful of scholars around theworld were documenting the CCP’s footprint in their ownregions。 From Europe to New Zealand and the UnitedStates， we saw similar patterns of UFWD influence onpolitics， media and academia。14 One politician in NewZealand had worked for Chinese military intelligenceearlier in his life， and it later emerged that he’dobscured that from the New Zealand government。15Media investigations into the activities of one UFWD-linkedbillionaire ended the political career of an up-and-comingAustralian senator， who’d been swayed by politicaldonations into siding with China’s position on the SouthChina Sea。16It looked as if the UFWD were controlling the strings ofParty influence abroad， but something didn’t add up。 Thedepartment has far less expertise in foreign politics thanother wings of the Party。 Its officials didn’t appear tohave the sort of leverage or resourcing you’d expect fortargeted operations against political elites， even if they dogive orders to sympathisers abroad。 On top of this，some key agents of influence didn’t have significant linksto the UFWD and instead had friends in the military，police or propaganda apparatus。17One missing piece stood out: the Party’s intelligenceapparatus。 Far more powerful and resourceful than theUFWD， intelligence agencies like the MSS combineunchecked coercive powers with a penchant forclandestine operations。 China’s intelligence agencies arenow the world’s largest and dedicate themselves toprotecting the Party’s interests while projecting its powerabroad。 If I had only rarely seen the fingerprints ofthese organisations in CCP influence operations， was Isimply not looking hard enough？Investigating clandestine activities is intrinsically hard。 Ibegan to hoard information on the MSS， starting withhistorical sources like memoirs， old court cases andretired intelligence officers who would agree to interviews。These pointed to a long tradition of hiding intelligenceoperations through united front work。 Party leader ZhouEnlai， the father of China’s intelligence community，advocated ‘nestling intelligence in the united front’ in1939， when the Party formed a tactical coalition with theKuomintang against the Japanese invasion。18 Then， asthe CCP conquered China in 1949， some of itsintelligence agencies outwardly called themselves UFWDsto obscure their secret operations。19 Through the1980s， Chinese intelligence agencies continued to embedspies into united front groups， media organisations， tradeagencies and cultural exchange bodies， exploiting theirnetworks for influence and espionage。20 This is not‘united front work’ but professional intelligence workmasquerading as something else。These footholds from history led to the discovery that，today， the MSS’s symbiosis with united front networks，business empires， public diplomacy and universities is asstrong as ever。 Only one in a hundred clues led me tomeaningful discoveries， but a few strong anchors wereenough to begin identifying covert operations currentlyactive across the globe。 Recognising a handful of keyindividuals as undercover MSS officers and then tracingthem from front group to front group eventuallyunravelled decades of covert influence operations， moresophisticated with each iteration。 These operations arewidespread， targeted and handled with direct involvementfrom Party leaders。 More than anything else， this is whatChina’s intelligence agencies excel at。The greatest of these covert operations was the MSSeffort to convince influential foreigners that China wouldrise peacefully and gradually liberalise。 It was stunninglysuccessful。 Stepping back， it’s clear that the MSS haswoven itself into the very fabric of China’s relationshipwith the world。 It is the invisible thread that bound theUnited States to ideologies of engagement andmythologies of China’s liberalisation。 In these pages youwill meet the plain-clothes MSS intelligence officers andagents who continue to broker access to informationabout China and its leaders。 You will also meet thewho’s who of American and international politics，business and academia who they courted and fooledwhile Western intelligence agencies failed to understandand disrupt these influence operations。‘All governments are run by liars’， to quote thejournalist I。 F。 Stone – himself a target of failed KGBcultivation – but few lies and attempts at manipulationhave shaped our world as much as those spun by theMSS。21 This book tells the story of those lies。 。。。more